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Abstract. This article examines the question of whether the atheist and the 
believer can understand each other, to the point of being friends intellectually. 
The answer is no. The atheist and the believer can be best enemies, but their 
epistemic disagreement is definitely radical. For it is not a  disagreement 
on religious belief itself, but about what allows the believer to believe. The 
article examines some aspects of John Greco’s concept of ‘friendly theism’, the 
discussion of conciliationism and anti-conciliatonism, and the epistemic role of 
the Holy Spirit.
I  came to the conclusion there was no medium, in true philosophy, 
between Atheism and Catholicity, and that a  perfect consistent mind  ... 
must embrace either the one or the other.
John Henry Cardinal Newman1
Is it really possible to exchange arguments between atheists and believers? 
We could be tempted to answer positively. Especially, if believers and 
atheists are philosophers, normally able to discuss independently of 
their personal deep convictions, because they are interested mainly by 
arguments. However, I want to show that intellectual friendship, that is to 
say, a good mutual understanding, leading to a common search for truth, 
on a neutral basis, is quite difficult between an atheist and a believer. If 
an atheist and a  theist are friends, it is despite religion, and not about 
religion.2 On such a topic, they can only be best enemies, respectful of 
1 Newman (1994: 182).
2 I will speak indifferently of the believer or theist, leaving aside the difficulties of the 
concept of theism.
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one another, but in full and irreducible disagreement. I  think we are 
encouraged to say the contrary by the fear to appear close-minded and 
intolerant.
I.
Let us first look at the way William Rowe describes the situation between 
the atheist and the believer.
It is not difficult for an  atheist to be friendly when he has reason to 
believe that the theist could not reasonably be expected to be acquainted 
with the grounds for disbelief that he (the atheist) possesses. For then 
the atheist may take the view that some theists are rationally justified in 
holding to theism, but would not be so were they to be acquainted with 
the grounds of belief – those grounds being sufficient to tip the scale in 
favour of atheism when balanced against the reasons the theist has in 
support of his belief. Friendly atheism becomes paradoxical, however, 
when the atheist contemplates believing that the theist has all the 
grounds for atheism that he, the atheist, has, and yet is rationally justified 
in maintaining his theistic belief. But even so excessively friendly a view 
as this perhaps can be held by the atheist if he also has some reason 
to think that the grounds for theism are not as telling as the theist is 
justified in taking them to be. (1979: 340)
According to Rowe, the friendly atheist thinks that the theist has done his 
best, and that the theist does not seem to be able to really do more. The 
friendly atheist adopts the attitude of a teacher realizing that a student 
cannot really go beyond what he has already done, simply because the 
student’s capacities are limited. The friendly atheist considers that it is 
not really the fault of the theist that he believes in God: he simply lacks 
the epistemic reasons to disbelieve. Atheist friendship to the theist then 
resembles a form of condescension! Or, the atheist is less arrogant. He 
adopts the attitude of loving parents: their child believes in Santa Claus: 
they would find it too bad, especially on December 24, to explain to the 
child that the reasons for such a belief are unsustainable and she or he 
has to abandon it. It seems to me that this friendly atheist is actually 
someone who thinks that the theist may be sincere in his error, but facing 
up to his epistemic responsibilities, the theist should renounce his belief.
We find another and different account, this time of friendly theism, 
and not of friendly atheism, proposed by John Greco:
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I  want to argue for a  version of friendly theism. More exactly, I  want 
to argue for an epistemology of religious belief on which three things 
can be true together: (a) belief in God is rational for some persons, (b) 
disbelief in God is rational for some persons, (c) no person is making 
an epistemic mistake or is otherwise epistemically flawed. (2008: 51)
John Greco claims that this position is friendlier than Rowe’s one. It 
explains, ‘how two people [believer and unbeliever] can easily differ 
in their knowledge of a  third person, and yet both be epistemically 
flawless’ (2008: 52). Friendly theism is made possible by an interpersonal 
conception of faith. Therefore, it seems that there is an  asymmetry 
between Rowe’s friendly atheism and Greco’s friendly theism. The friendly 
atheist sees the theist as someone lacking epistemological lucidity or even 
seriousness. This amounts even perhaps to a  form of intellectual vice. 
The friendly theist sees the atheist as someone who did not experience 
a special interpersonal relationship with God. But the atheist, according 
to Greco’s friendly theist, is not at all lacking epistemological seriousness 
and lucidity. The difference between the believer and the unbeliever, 
according to the friendly theist, is more existential than intellectual. This 
is the reason why John Greco’s friendly theist is truly friendly, while the 
Rowe’s friendly atheist seems to finally be an arrogant or even scornful 
character. I wonder if it would be a  so good thing for the theist to be 
friend with someone who thinks that theistic beliefs are not epistemically 
serious, and even, perhaps, that they are mainly errors ... The only way 
for the believer to stay friends with the atheist seems to be to renounce 
his alleged crazy beliefs, at least when it has been explained to him that 
they are false and shown why. Rowe’s atheist is definitively a  strange 
friend for the theist.
Then, I  propose to have another friendly theist, very different 
from Greco’s one. Let us suppose now that friendly theism is the exact 
converse of friendly atheism. Such a friendly theism would not be much 
friendlier than friendly atheism according to Rowe – it means, I think, it 
would not be friendly at all. It would suggest that the atheist exaggerates 
the strength of his arguments a  lot, or that he does not understand 
something, without being in this way culpable. He is not aware that he 
is intellectually irresponsible, but surely he is. The friendly theist could 
even interpret the atheist’s incapacity to have a religious experience in 
terms of an  intellectual vice, exactly as Rowe’s friendly atheist thinks 
that the theist would be epistemically irresponsible still to believe after 
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it has been explained to him that his reasons are bad, or that there are 
good reasons not to believe. The friendly theist would think that the 
atheist does not experience something because he does not understand 
something, and that he does not understand something because he does 
not believe.
Nobody would think that the friendly theist I described is actually 
friendly. This discussion about friendship between theists and atheists 
leads me to the conclusion that they have no reason to be intellectually 
friends with each other. They can avoid getting on to the subject of 
religion, and appreciate each other as human beings, or even simply as 
colleagues in the department of philosophy. They may also belong to 
the same fire brigade and do in it a lot of valuable work together. They 
may also have affection towards each other. They may even be in love, 
why not? But intellectually, they disagree, fundamentally. And such 
a disagreement is nothing friendly. First, what constitutes a warranted 
belief, with perfect sense, for one, has no right to be believed, or even 
perhaps no sense, for another. Second, they are not intellectual peers and 
cannot consider each other this way.
Peter Geach says :
If I did not judge Christian belief to be ‘more true, more correct, more 
reasonable’ than modern atheistic humanism, then I  could not be 
a Christian. Obviously we who say this are ‘using our language-game as 
a basis’ from which to judge what other people maintain; but anybody 
is bound to do this if he makes a  judgment that other people contest. 
(1990: 300)3
It would make no sense to relativize the disagreement, by saying that 
the atheist and the believer do not share the same language-game, as 
some Neo-Wittgensteinians suggest.4 Or so to say that the theist judge 
the atheist in his own language game, and the atheist in his own one, and 
that they do not disagree finally, but that they live, so to say, in different 
worlds. But what does it change finally? The believer thinks that the 
atheist cannot understand because he does not believe, and the atheist 
thinks that the believer is blinded by his belief and unable to perceive 
the weakness of his reasons to believe or even that he lacks any reason.
3 Terms in quotation marks are those of Norman Malcolm. Peter Geach is responding 
to him in this passage.
4 The best and most convincing formulation of this thesis remains for me the book by 
Dewi Phillips, The Concept of Prayer (1965).
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II.
Conciliationism and anti-conciliationism are the two mains positions 
on the topic of religious disagreement. The first thesis claims that if the 
disputants are just as qualified and well positioned to assess a disputed 
proposition, then they ought to adopt a  level of confidence that gives 
significant weight to the views of the other side. But if each one gives 
significant weight to the other views, can they still believe in what they 
are supposed to believe, even to a  lesser degree? They seem simply to 
do as if they were believing something, but no more to fully believe it, 
or to believe to a certain degree. They even know that there are good 
reasons not to believe it. But is it possible to believe p and at the same 
time to know that there are good reasons for a competent person not 
to believe p?5 For me a positive answer is not at all obvious. However, 
it is surely possible not to judge someone negatively, when he does not 
believe that p, and you believe that p. But this is something else than 
conciliationism. But does conciliationism makes sense, even if it appears 
to be the attitude encouraged by the dominant ethic of tolerance? Do 
you really have beliefs you think there are good reasons for competent 
persons not to have?
Anti-conciliationism claims that we may believe that p with confidence 
despite the fact that a qualified and well-positioned person, who seems 
as qualified as ourselves to assess the proposition’s plausibility, hold p 
not to be epistemologically safe. Let us suppose my reader and I  are 
excellent philosophers (not a problematic supposition), interested in the 
question of whether we have the right not to believe in God. Each of 
us is thoroughly acquainted with all of the extant arguments, thought 
experiments, and intuition pumps that the literature has to offer. None 
of us is in bad faith. We are more or less equally reliable when it comes to 
making judgments about the domain in question. Do we have to revise 
our original view, if each of us should give equal weight to his or her 
opinion and to the opinion of the other? One attitude, which sceptical 
philosophers encourage, would be to suspend our judgment.6 But there is 
another possible attitude. No intellectual consideration forces someone 
to believe that atheism or agnosticism are superior to any competing 
5 Moore’s Paradox consists to say ‘p and I do not believe that p’. Here the paradox 
would be ‘I believe that p and I know good reasons not to believe p’.
6 I am aware that it would be necessary here to consider all the sceptical literature 
about the suspension of judgment.
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position concerning belief in God. It is a thesis that Peter van Inwagen 
seems to defend (in his paper ‘Is God an Unnecessary Hypothesis’):
Consider any proposition whose truth is known to be highly improbable 
but which is not known to be certainly false. (For example: the proposition 
that New York City will be destroyed by a huge meteorite at 11: 23 p.m. 
on August 12, 2073.) If someone who is aware of this known probability 
does not accept the denial of that proposition (and, of course, does not 
accept the proposition itself), that person violates no norm of rationality. 
(2005: 136)
So, even if theism were highly improbable, it is not irrational not to 
accept atheism or agnosticism, if theism is not known to be certainly 
false. In this case, the reason why atheists and theists have difficulties 
being intellectual friends is perhaps that all atheists prefer that all non-
atheists change their mind and become atheists, simply because for 
them theism is very highly improbable, or that, at least, theists become 
agnostics, by suspending their judgment. But in fact, some non-atheists 
stay theists and even do not became agnostics, even after the atheist 
briefing. And the problem for the atheists is that such an attitude is not 
at all irrational, or even epistemically vicious. The reason why is given by 
Peter van Inwagen when he says:
It would seem that all human beings have beliefs that are not forced on 
them by the totality of the relevant intellectual considerations of which 
they are aware. Most of our philosophical beliefs are like that. (2005: 142)
A  Moorean Argument shows that sceptical doubts are always less 
believable finally than what they serve to raise doubt about. For example, 
the doubt about the fact that I  have two hands is less believable than 
that the fact that this is my hand (and I show you my hand), and this is 
another one (and I show you the other one). A Moorean fact is one we 
know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument 
to the contrary. It seems that a believer could always appeal to a Moorean 
Argument. This could be what Peter van Inwagen does in this passage:
If someone tells me that, if I can adduce no articulable reason for believing 
in material things, then my belief in material things must be irrational, 
I’ll reply that my critic has a mistaken and impossibly demanding theory 
of rationality. I want to say something similar about my belief in God. 
Why do I believe in God? Certainly not because I can write down some 
reason for believing in God that would force anyone who understood it 
to share my belief. There is no such reason. I can – I often do – set out 
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reasons for believing in God, but these reasons are not coercive: a person 
who understands them and is unmoved by them is not, by that very fact, 
irrational. (2005: 145)
According to Kit Fine, ‘in this age of post-Moorean modesty, many of 
us are inclined to doubt that philosophy is in possession of arguments 
that might genuinely serve to undermine what we ordinarily believe’ 
(2001:  2). This could be the case also of the religious believer. His 
religious beliefs are quite ordinary for him. Nothing special, just as 
philosophical beliefs could be, or scientific ones, for example. If the 
atheist says only that the believer has no argument to convince him 
to believe in the existence of God, how could it be a  good argument 
against a Moorean Argument? But sceptics are generally not troubled 
by a Moorean Argument, because scepticism consists in ignoring such 
an argument, or in pretending that this is not an argument. Surely, the 
atheist could claim to have positive arguments against the existence of 
God – the ‘Argument from Evil’ or the ‘Hiddenness Argument’, and two 
dozen, at least, others. Fine adds something interesting in our context: 
‘It may perhaps be conceded that the arguments of the skeptic appear 
to be utterly compelling; but the Mooreans among us will hold that the 
very plausibility of our ordinary beliefs is reason enough for supposing 
that there must be something wrong in the skeptic’s arguments, even if 
we are unable to say what it is.’ (2001: 2)
However, first, this argument seems to immunize all belief, no matter 
how ridiculous it is: belief in aliens or belief in the return of the Great 
Pumpkin, belief in some gigantic conspiracy, and so on.7 And second, the 
argument refers to ‘common beliefs’. However, believing in the existence 
of God or that Jesus is the Son of God, let alone belief in Mary’s virginity 
or her Immaculate Conception, these are not at all ordinary beliefs. It 
is possible to defend the right to believe that I have two hands, facing 
sceptical concerns. But some philosophers would judge it to be clearly 
unacceptable to propose an epistemological defence of our right to have 
religious beliefs on the basis of a Moorean Argument, or by saying that 
the existence of God is a Moorean fact! These are typically the kind of 
beliefs we must justify and not simply entertain without epistemological 
anxieties and proclaim without feeling the necessity to justify oneself.
7 I  say nothing here of the Great Pumpkin Objection sometimes advanced against 
what Plantinga calls ‘warranted Christian belief ’, but I discuss the point in Pouivet (2002) 
and (2013).
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But I disagree with those philosophers who put aside religious beliefs, 
and especially have for these beliefs requirements they have for any other.8 
The possibility of a Moorean Argument by a believer is the reason why 
atheists and theists cannot be friends intellectually. Generally, of course, 
the believer uses such a Moorean Argument implicitly. What seems to 
the atheist a strong epistemological necessity to justify religious beliefs 
(and in fact the atheist claims it is impossible) appears to be without any 
sense, because it is exactly the kind of beliefs which are not to be justified. 
The atheist suspects that the believer succumbs to wishful thinking and 
even intellectual dishonesty.9 But the theist would say that he does not 
succumb to wishful thinking and is not intellectually dishonest. But why 
does the believer adopt such an attitude? Because he believes he received 
a gift, a grace, to believe what he is believing. The atheist seems deprived 
of this grace. For a believer, religious beliefs are ‘built in him’. Even if 
these beliefs appear ‘extraordinary’, and extraordinary irresponsible and 
dishonest in the eyes of an atheist, it is because he is an atheist, and not 
because of some epistemological defects of such beliefs.
Let us recall these passages of the New Testament: ‘And Jesus 
answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona: for flesh 
and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in 
heaven.’ (Matthew 17:17), or: ‘No one can say “Jesus is Lord” except by 
the Holy Spirit’ (1 Corinthians 12:3), among similar passages. Let us also 
recall Anselm’s well-known prayer:
I acknowledge, Lord, and I give thanks that You have created Your image 
in me, so that I  may remember You, think of You, love You. But this 
image is so effaced and worn away by vice, so darkened by the smoke 
of sin, that it cannot do what it was made to do unless You renew it and 
reform it. I  do not try, Lord, to attain Your lofty heights, because my 
understanding is in no way equal to it. But I  do desire to understand 
Your truth a little, that truth that my heart believes and loves. For I do 
not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may 
understand. For I  believe this also, that ‘unless I  believe, I  shall not 
understand’ (Isa. 7:9). (1998: 87)
Without belief and even faith, no understanding is possible. It is the reason 
why, at least in a revealed religion, there can be no epistemic symmetry 
8 See Van Inwagen (1998).
9 Such an intellectual dishonesty is of course at the base of William Clifford’s critique 
of religious beliefs.
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between the believer and the atheist, and no epistemic parity. The 
believer prays for his more perfect conversion and for the conversion of 
the atheist; the atheist thinks that the believer is intellectually blinded. 
Or even, the atheists think the believer does not really believe what he 
says he believes; he imagines a God, he makes himself believe in all such 
things (on the model of the attitude we are supposed to adopt when we 
are reading a novel or watching a movie).10
The atheist could reply: ‘I  beg your pardon. Do you mean that if 
I  am an atheist it is, precisely, that I have not received a divine grace, 
the gift of faith, which is the source of belief?11 But if God is the source 
of your own belief in its existence, there is an obvious epistemological 
vicious circle. You believe that God exists because God is the source of 
your belief that God exists. Your reasoning is not serious. It shows, if 
necessary, what your pitiful epistemological attitude is, and even your 
intellectual blindness! Speaking this way, I try to stay within the limits 
of a friendly conversation.’ Now, the theist might answer that there may 
well be good arguments for the existence of God, based on non-religious 
premises, and not at all supposing a divine grace. Such arguments (and 
even proofs) could be found in abundance in the works of the best 
philosophers and theologians. But it seems that only the one who has 
received from God an apprehension of divine things can assess the truth 
of the Gospel. And this is exactly the grace the atheist is deprived. The 
theist could recall one of the Jonathan Edwards’ wonderful sermons:
The mind of man is naturally full of prejudices against the truth of divine 
things: it is full of enmity against the doctrines of the gospel; which is 
a  disadvantage to those arguments that prove their truth, and causes 
them to lose their force upon the mind. But when a person has discovered 
to him the divine excellency of Christian doctrines, this destroys the 
enmity, removes those prejudices, and sanctifies the reason, and causes 
it to lie open to the force of arguments for their truth ... God, in letting 
in this light into the soul, deals with man according to his nature, or as 
a rational creature; and makes use of his human faculties. But yet this 
light is not the less immediately from God for that; though the faculties 
are made use of, ‘tis as the subject and not as the cause; and that acting of 
the faculties in it, is not the cause, but is either implied in the thing itself 
(in the light that is imparted), or is the consequence of it. (1999: 128)
10 On this attitude of religious make-believe, see the third chapter of Pouivet (2013).
11 On such a possibility, see Pouivet (2013: 223-226).
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Is it different from what Greco says: ‘our knowledge of persons tends to 
come through perception and testimony rather than through reasoning 
or arguments’ (2008: 52)? God in this case is supposed to be a person.12
On the perception model, we learn about who God is and what God is 
like by means of experiencing God in our lives. On the testimony model, 
we come to know about God by means of someone telling us about 
Him – either God himself, or other people who have had an experience 
of God in their lives. (2008: 53)
According to Greco, the perception model and the testimony model make 
it easy to understand how people can have rational disagreements, when 
neither one or the other is making an epistemic mistake or is otherwise 
epistemically flawed. But it is just not that easy to see how the atheist will 
not be led to think that the disagreement results from the fact that the 
believer indulges himself in his own religious experience. It is precisely 
the alleged irrationality of such an experience he contests. Conversely, 
says the believer, if this experience is a grace, the one who does not have 
it is devoid of what gives the ability to understand the value of certain 
arguments that might be made in favour of the existence of God. Greco 
surely is right to say that ‘it looks like the theist is going to have to say 
that there is something cognitively wrong with the atheist (or other non-
theist) – that she (he) is epistemically flawed after all’ (2008: 54). This is 
why the friendship between the atheist and the believer has to be based 
on something other than the recognition of their intellectual symmetry 
and parity. I mean that if the atheist believes that the theist is blinded, and 
if the theist believes that the atheist has not received a grace, how could 
they be friends intellectually? If they can understand and appreciate 
each other humanly, they are intellectually not only opposed but even 
enemies: they have no good mutual understanding, leading to a common 
search for truth, on a neutral basis. They can be the best enemies, still 
able to debate, for example, but they actually are worst possible friends, 
because there is something very important between them.
12 I will not discuss this point, but it is far from evident that God is a person. That there 
are three persons in one God does not mean that God is a person ... and neither does it 
mean that to believe in the existence of God is the same as to believe in the existence 
of a  person. But we could say, more safely, that there is an  analogy between belief in 
the existence of God and belief in the existence of a person. I leave this important but 
difficult topic aside.
115ATHEISTS AND BELIEVERS: FRIENDS OR ENEMIES
III.
We have to consider the question of the asymmetry of justification. 
Discussions about peer disagreement often presuppose evidential 
equivalence. Believers and unbelievers would be equivalently familiar 
with the relevant evidence and arguments that bear on the question 
whether p. But in such discussions, we must take into account, to use 
Ernest Sosa’s words, ‘how deeply hidden and undisclosable reasons 
can be’, and ‘how epistemically effective a  reason can be despite being 
dialectically ineffective’ (2010: 296). And in the case of disagreement 
about religious matters, the asymmetry of justification plays a  crucial 
role. They are hidden and undisclosable reasons to believe in God: 
they are dialectically ineffective, because they are the fruits of a divine 
gift,13 even if they can be epistemically effective and, above all, rationally 
respectable.
The place of this grace, of this gift, forbids a definition of the atheist 
and the theist as epistemic peers. If the theist received an intellectual gift 
from divine grace, atheist and theist are of course not equally likely to be 
right. The believer benefits from divine help. The very notion of a sharable 
evidence, on which the atheist and the theist could be agree, and from 
which they can hope to convince each other, or even simply discuss, as if 
the question was to know the merit of a scientific hypothesis, makes no 
sense for such a reason in this context. Sometimes, philosophers seem 
to suppose that atheism, agnosticism, and theism are hypotheses of this 
kind, to be compared in an academic setting. But if faith, of which belief 
is a constitutive element, is not to be attracted by a hypothesis, but is truly 
a divine grace, the best possible relation between God and his creatures, 
the dialectical model of exchanging arguments simply cannot apply. This 
is sometimes supposed to be the model we use in the scientific debate 
(or we are supposed to have to use in such a debate). But the content of 
faith is not like a paper we send to referees with the hope that it can be 
accepted in a journal, or what is in discussion during a conference. The 
mistake is to think that this intellectual model, of working together on 
assumptions, or from neutral data, defines rationality.
The theist cannot and must not consider the atheist a peer on religious 
matters. Let us compare: one does not consider someone else to be a peer 
13 Here we should develop the relationship between the virtues, gifts, beatitudes, and 
fruits of the Holy Spirit. Belief and faith are intellectual products whose source is the gift 
of the Holy Spirit.
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about one’s own headache. In this case, the belief ’s warrant does not come 
from a sharable basis between two disputants. In both cases, headache 
and religious faith, belief ’s warrant derives from the very fact believed 
even if there are no sharable reasons. So, it is perfectly reasonable for 
the theist to downgrade the atheist, even with no independent reason, 
sharable with the theist. The reference to a headache is not intended at all 
to suggest that faith is internal and subjective; and therefore, it would turn 
out to be inaccessible to arguments. It is simply to say that our reasons for 
believing something may not be shareable without being unreasonable. 
It is possible to consider them as sufficient to reject an atheist critique.
The type of knowledge we have of the existence of God is closer to the 
one we have of our own headache than it is to the existence of a certain 
planet in the universe. One does not believe in this existence as the 
conclusion of an argument. It is also close to the knowledge I have of the 
existence of my own wife. (Even if, of course, there is no relation between 
the two.) The atheist could not accept that a person can claim and believe 
in the existence of God in the same way that he believes in the existence 
of his headache or in the existence of his wife, that is to say without 
feeling obliged to give reasons the atheist expects, recognizes, and 
even, eventually, could finally share. But it just shows that the demand 
of the atheist is not acceptable, and that this demand does not enter in 
a friendly relation. The theist intends to monitor the rationality of one 
who has no reason to think himself irrational. It is like the situation of 
the one who is required to prove his nationality, even though it would 
make no sense to think that he can have another, and while he has no 
evidence to provide.14
We do not believe in God apart from God himself, as we believe in 
the existence of a  planet because it is the best possible explanation of 
certain astronomical phenomena. Would it be friendly of someone to ask 
you to give credible evidence of your wife when you start talking to him 
about her? Sure, you could sometimes give him what he asks. However, 
he could have a level of epistemological requirement so high – the kind 
that the sceptic can display – that it would make satisfaction impossible. 
Anyway, it is no more a  friendly relationship between interlocutors. 
Rather it is a  strong disagreement between people who do not share 
much intellectually, even if they can of course respect each other (and 
even appreciate each other).
14 This has sometimes been the situation of some people in France in recent years.
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Ernest Sosa says – but, I must be clear, he does not speak about religious 
beliefs – that ‘our inability to defeat an opponent in public debate need 
not rationally require us to abandon our beliefs’ (2010: 294). The theist 
downgrades his opponent’s judgment that he is wrong, or that he has no 
good reasons to believe in the existence of God. To downgrade is simply 
to think that the atheist must go wrong somehow. And likely if the atheist 
goes wrong it is that he did not receive a certain gift. Such downgrading 
is based on the very substance of the disagreement: on this question, the 
existence of God and other beliefs about it, atheists and theists are more 
likely to be best intellectual enemies than good intellectual friends.
According to the equal weight view, when you learn of your friend’s 
disagreement, you are called upon to consider him equally likely to be 
right. This is not at all possible for the theist: it would make no sense, 
exactly like if you would consider seriously the person who tells you that 
you do not have a headache or that your wife’s existence is disputable 
because you have no better argument than that you do not feel well or 
that you love her! And there are perfectly good reasons for the theist to 
downgrade his opponent without intellectual embarrassment or shame. 
He does not disrespect him. If so, they are not good friends at all with 
regard to religion  – because of the faithless assurance of the atheist  – 
rather they will be best enemies.
It is important to add that the theist is not at all exempt from arguing 
from his side as fully and convincingly as he can manage, and even that 
it would be a form of respect to the atheist to argue. ‘Be ready always to 
give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is 
in you with meekness and fear’ (1 Peter 3:15). But the believer’s inability 
to defeat his opponent is not a reason for him to abandon his beliefs. In 
fact, are the arguments that everyone, atheist or theist, advance really 
intended to convince the other? Rather they seem to have a  negative 
function: to show that those who believe in the existence of God, or that 
God does not exist, or that we cannot know whether God exists or not, do 
not consider themselves released from any epistemological obligations. 
They are not released from such obligations, but they do not believe 
on the basis of arguments, even if they would be able to deliver such 
arguments to defend their beliefs. This is the reason why we can have 
very serious doubts about the possibility that the disagreement between 
atheist and theist could be dispelled by an exchange of arguments, based 
on intellectual friendship. But that does not mean that religious belief 
is a  subjective passion that would ridicule any rational theology, and 
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especially natural theology. However, the function of natural theory and 
rational theology is not foundational: they do not serve to give a basis to 
the theist beliefs.
There are many books in which a  theist and atheist discuss and 
exchange arguments in the greatest respect one another. For example, 
Atheism and Theism is a dialogue, or so to speak, between Jack Smart 
and John Haldane (2003). So to speak, the book gives the impression of 
two parallel discourses, despite the efforts made by the two friends to 
exchange arguments. Something goes wrong. We know, in advance and 
without suspense at all, that they will obviously not change their minds; 
and indeed the arguments that they advance are already well-known to 
each other, even if they manage to give them a more contemporary look. 
In the preface to the second edition of this book (actually one of the best 
in this fashionable genre of a serious debate between serious philosophers 
who seriously disagree), we read that ‘the majority of reviewers chose to 
observe the friendly and respectful character of (the) exchange’ (2003: 
x). It would be far more interesting to know why Smart and Haldane are 
unable to convince each other, and why their exchange changes nothing 
regarding what they believe or do not believe! The final form of this 
preface seems to be simply a good example – of course, nothing bad in 
itself – of academic politeness. The protagonists say that they hope that 
‘this extended discussion will re-engage earlier readers and draw new 
ones into that common search of truth about atheism and theism’ (2003: 
xi). In a sense, if it is simply to characterize the two opposing positions, 
the book, one more time, does this quite well. But if it is for the theist to 
notice he was blinded, or for the atheist suddenly to realize that his own 
arguments are not conclusive, really nobody thinks it will happen and 
even could happen.
In the original preface of the book, it is said that ‘Haldane is 
committed to the proposition that if it were impossible, in principle, 
to prove the existence of God (allowing some breadth to the notion of 
proof), then what his religion teaches in this important respect is false’ 
(2003: 4). But manifestly, Jack Smart resisted, and does not think at all 
that John Haldane possesses a  proof of the existence of God, or even 
something close to a proof, like a  justified true belief, or a hypothesis 
to the best explanation. That does not mean that the existence of God 
cannot be known by the light of natural reason. But this possibility does 
not imply that Jack has to be convinced by the arguments of John, even 
if Jack is intellectually honest, perfectly competent, and is even John’s 
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friend. And nothing changes for Haldane if Smart is not convinced in his 
turn. Presumably, the ability of Haldane and Smart, impressive for sure, 
to give excellent arguments, was not decisive for either one or the other.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this paper, I quote William Rowe who says that ‘it is 
not difficult for an atheist to be friendly when he has reason to believe 
that the theist could not reasonably be expected to be acquainted with the 
grounds for disbelief that he (the atheist) possesses’ (1979: 340). I have 
come now to the conclusion that it is difficult for the theist to be friendly 
when he has reason to believe that the atheist could not reasonably be 
expected to be acquainted with the grounds for belief that he (the theist) 
possesses. These grounds consist basically of divine grace. This does not 
imply that religious belief is not reasonable. Indeed, we can rationally 
believe without having shareable reasons, such as those that we share in 
philosophical or scientific debates.
‘But he that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged 
of no man.’ (1 Corinthians 2:15) This quotation explains what makes 
intellectual friendship between the believer and the unbeliever so 
difficult. The truly difficult question for the theist is not that of a hidden 
god, but why God does not extend His grace to all mankind, and why 
the atheist, intellectually honest and even generous, disagrees with him.
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